My primary research interest lies at the intersection of game theory and blockchains, although I am broadly interested in algorithmic game theory and mechanism design. This page describes the directions I am currently most interested in, rather than attempting to maintain a complete list of my publications. Google Scholar is much better at keeping track of those than I am.

Protocol vs Mechanism Design in Blockchains: A blockchain protocol can control only what it can observe and enforce on-chain. Network participants, however, can coordinate, make side payments, and deviate in ways that are entirely invisible to the protocol. I am interested in understanding the boundary between these two worlds: what should a blockchain enforce on-chain, and what should it simply leave participants to determine off-chain? More broadly, I want to understand when carefully engineering incentives inside the protocol is useful, and when the protocol is better served by imposing a small set of robust constraints and allowing participants to optimize within them. We study a variety of blockchain design problems through this lens, including

• Transaction fee protocols vs mechanisms: GTW24, GTW26
• Collusion resistant secret-sharing mechanisms: KGPBW25
• Manipulating consensus protocols: FGHHWY24

Bayesian mechanism design: Auction design is more delicate than classical algorithm design because every participant comes with their own objective and can respond strategically to the mechanism. Much of my work focuses on modeling novel economic environments and understanding how mechanisms perform in these settings. This includes work on

• Multilateral trade: EGR
• Combinatorial pen testing: GH25
• Trading-off usage and availability of resources: GHSvA26

Economics and Computation: Beyond these themes, I am broadly interested in problems at the intersection of economics and computation that might not fit neatly into the categories above.

• Stable matchings: GPNP21